October 31st, 2009 at 7:53 pm
The functions of the right and left brain are only a small portion of the potential that comprises THE MIND. The mind and the brain are two very different things. You can think of the brain as the hard drive of the computer and the mind as the software. Your mind is the intelligence that is in every cell, every system and every organ of your body. It is that intangible, incredible, and awe-inspiring part of you that thinks, remembers, sorts information, makes judgments, forms habits, discerns, distinguishes, communicates and otherwise makes you who you are. It is the genius within.
Your mind takes in all information through the five senses (sight, touch, hearing, smell and taste). You can liken the five senses to the keyboard on the computer. You receive input through your senses, your “data entry” system. Your brain then stores, categorizes and utilizes this information. A genius knows how to access that information and then apply it in discovering the solutions to any problems that may arise. It is therefore essential that you discover your own individual style for gathering and communicating information.
Some of us process sensory input more effectively through visual means, others through auditory stimuli, and others through a kinesthetic (a touch or feel) approach. Here’s a very simple way to begin to contemplate which way your genius accesses information. Imagine for a moment that you are buying a new item of clothing for an important meeting. Would you be most influenced to buy primarily for a) the color and style of the outfit; b) the benefits the salesperson tells you about the clothing; c) the texture and feel of the fabric. If you chose “A”, your brain receives information primarily through visual means. If you chose “B”, you perceive information primarily through auditory means. If “C”, you most likely access information through kinesthetic means.
Everyone learns and communicates in all three of these modes. However, most people have developed a natural preference, and tend to use one method more frequently. As an awakening genius, it’s your goal to become aware of your preference and then strive to strike a balance between all three modes: visual, auditory, and kinesthetic.
Are you willing to stretch your abilities by consciously choosing to use your other senses more? Can you imagine the benefits of opening your mind to receive ALL the input from the world around you? Doing so will give you an awareness of an exciting world that’s been there all along, but which you may have been missing.
It is natural for you to use what is comfortable, but the awakened genius is willing to grow. Like the turtle, you won’t go far without coming out of your shell. You will be pleasantly surprised as you practice using and developing your other senses. You will notice how your memory improves and how easy it becomes for you to make choices. You will discover a whole new world of communication. Once you learn to create a balance in perception, you will be well on your way to thinking holographically &ndash and using the full power of your genius!
The MMPI (Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory), composed by Hathaway (a psychologist) and McKinley (a physician) is the outcome of decades of research into personality disorders. The revised version, the MMPI-II (also known as MMPI-2), was published in 1989 but was received cautiously. MMPI-II changed the scoring method and some of the normative data. It was, therefore, hard to compare it to its much hallowed (and oft validated) predecessor.
The MMPI-II is made of 567 binary (true or false) items (questions). Each item requires the subject to respond: “This is true (or false) as applied to me”. There are no “correct” answers. The test booklet allows the diagnostician to provide a rough assessment of the patient (the “basic scales”) based on the first 370 queries (though it is recommended to administer all of 567 of them).
Based on numerous studies, the items are arranged in scales. The responses are compared to answers provided by “control subjects”. The scales allow the diagnostician to identify traits and mental health problems based on these comparisons. In other words, there are no answers that are “typical to paranoid or narcissistic or antisocial patients”. There are only responses that deviate from an overall statistical pattern and conform to the reaction patterns of other patients with similar scores. The nature of the deviation determines the patient’s traits and tendencies - but not his or her diagnosis!
The interpreted outcomes of the MMPI-II are phrased thus: “The test results place subject X in this group of patients who, statistically-speaking, reacted similarly. The test results also set subject X apart from these groups of people who, statistically-speaking, responded differently”. The test results would never say: “Subject X suffers from (this or that) mental health problem”.
There are three validity scales and ten clinical ones in the original MMPI-II, but other scholars derived hundreds of additional scales. For instance: to help in diagnosing personality disorders, most diagnosticians use either the MMPI-I with the Morey-Waugh-Blashfield scales in conjunction with the Wiggins content scales - or the MMPI-II updated to include the Colligan-Morey-Offord scales.
The validity scales indicate whether the patient responded truthfully and accurately or was trying to manipulate the test. They pick up patterns. Some patients want to appear normal (or abnormal) and consistently choose what they believe are the “correct” answers. This kind of behavior triggers the validity scales. These are so sensitive that they can indicate whether the subject lost his or her place on the answer sheet and was responding randomly! The validity scales also alert the diagnostician to problems in reading comprehension and other inconsistencies in response patterns.
The clinical scales are dimensional (though not multiphasic as the test’s misleading name implies). They measure hypochondriasis, depression, hysteria, psychopathic deviation, masculinity-femininity, paranoia, psychasthenia, schizophrenia, hypomania, and social introversion. There are also scales for alcoholism, post-traumatic stress disorder, and personality disorders.
The interpretation of the MMPI-II is now fully computerized. The computer is fed with the patients’ age, sex, educational level, and marital status and does the rest.
The spring 2006 statewide report cards for New York Schools show that more schools are making progress in meeting their achievement goals for improvement in English and mathematics, as mandated by the state. Though achieving standards in middle school English is still a problem, fewer students have serious academic problems at the elementary and middle school levels, while more of these students are demonstrating higher standards in mathematics.
The performance of the elementary and middle schools has improved significantly. For example, the percentage of students meeting all standards almost doubled from 22 percent in year 2000 to 41 percent in 2005. The percentage of fourth graders with serious academic problems declined from 19 percent in year 2000 to only eight percent in 2005.
At the high school level, 64 percent of the students in the Class of 2005 graduated in a four-year period. More students are graduating each year and more are earning Regents Diplomas, but the graduation rate still is too low.
The New York schools report cards also showed a correlation between attendance and graduation rates. When attendance falls below 92 percent, the graduation rate declines significantly. When attendance is below 88 percent, the graduation rate plummets.
State Education Commissioner Richard Mills believes the graduation rate is much too low. Though student achievement is improving, Mills believes that new reforms are needed to improve the graduation rates of the future New York schools classes.
During the next few months, the New York schools will take a series of aggressive actions to solve the problem. Actions under consideration are:
• Set both graduation and attendance goals, measuring the results annually, and raising the levels each year;
• Hold each school accountable for meeting the targeted goals in both graduation and attendance by accelerating the Schools Under Registration Review (SURR) requirements;
• Reform current teaching standards by requiring all teachers to teach only in their certified areas by a certain date; and
• Monitor safety plans and violent incident data, and requiring reforms to ensure a safe learning environment for both students and teachers.
Additionally, the New York schools have partially completed a student record system, giving each student a unique statewide identifier. In the future, the identifiers will ensure that each student is counted within the school report cards. This allows for a more accurate measurement of a school’s progress and student achievement.
What are the best sights for astronomy? That’s hard to say. There is so much out there that the determination of what are the best sights for astronomy probably requires you to do some advance study and decide for yourself what you’d like to learn about.
There are a couple of very helpful books that can guide you through a determination of what are the best views for astronomy.
A new beginner or intermediate handbook for stargazers is the “Guide to Stars and Planets” by Patrick Moore. This accomplished astronomer has concisely gathered reference information on the night sky that details the best views for astronomy. It looks at the moon as well as the various constellations. You’ll find charts, photographs and maps that have been garnered through study with earth bound and space telescopes. The best areas for astronomy are laid out in this book as well as some guidance on how you’re going to take a look at the best views for astronomy yourself.
Here you’ll find guidance on what telescope to buy, how to set up an observatory for yourself as home and how to become a good amateur astronomer. Details about the perfect sights for astronomy include information on the moon, our sun, the various planets, the debris found in the solar system, a myriad number of stars, the various galaxies we know about, the constellations, and comets, asteroids, meteors and eclipses that humans have noted and photographed in the past.
The best sights for astronomy have been highlighted in the book, including important features in the moon and the stars we’ve studied extensively.
I. Exposition
In the movie “Shattered” (1991), Dan Merrick survives an accident and develops total amnesia regarding his past. His battered face is reconstructed by plastic surgeons and, with the help of his loving wife, he gradually recovers his will to live. But he never develops a proper sense of identity. It is as though he is constantly ill at ease in his own body. As the plot unravels, Dan is led to believe that he may have murdered his wife’s lover, Jack. This thriller offers additional twists and turns but, throughout it all, we face this question:
Dan has no recollection of being Dan. Dan does not remember murdering Jack. It seems as though Dan’s very identity has been erased. Yet, Dan is in sound mind and can tell right from wrong. Should Dan be held (morally and, as a result, perhaps legally as well) accountable for Jack’s murder?
Would the answer to this question still be the same had Dan erased from his memory ONLY the crime -but recalled everything else (in an act of selective dissociation)? Do our moral and legal accountability and responsibility spring from the integrity of our memories? If Dan were to be punished for a crime he doesn’t have the faintest recollection of committing - wouldn’t he feel horribly wronged? Wouldn’t he be justified in feeling so?
There are many states of consciousness that involve dissociation and selective amnesia: hypnosis, trance and possession, hallucination, illusion, memory disorders (like organic, or functional amnesia), depersonalization disorder, dissociative fugue, dreaming, psychosis, post traumatic stress disorder, and drug-induced psychotomimetic states.
Consider this, for instance:
What if Dan were the victim of a Multiple Personality Disorder (now known as “Dissociative Identity Disorder”)? What if one of his “alters” (i.e., one of the multitude of “identities” sharing Dan’s mind and body) committed the crime? Should Dan still be held responsible? What if the alter “John” committed the crime and then “vanished”, leaving behind another alter (let us say, “Joseph”) in control? Should “Joseph” be held responsible for the crime “John” committed? What if “John” were to reappear 10 years after he “vanished”? What if he were to reappear 50 years after he “vanished”? What if he were to reappear for a period of 90 days - only to “vanish” again? And what is Dan’s role in all this? Who, exactly, then, is Dan?
II. Who is Dan?
Buddhism compares Man to a river. Both retain their identity despite the fact that their individual composition is different at different moments. The possession of a body as the foundation of a self-identity is a dubious proposition. Bodies change drastically in time (consider a baby compared to an adult). Almost all the cells in a human body are replaced every few years. Changing one’s brain (by transplantation) - also changes one’s identity, even if the rest of the body remains the same.
Thus, the only thing that binds a “person” together (i.e., gives him a self and an identity) is time, or, more precisely, memory. By “memory” I also mean: personality, skills, habits, retrospected emotions - in short: all long term imprints and behavioural patterns. The body is not an accidental and insignificant container, of course. It constitutes an important part of one’s self-image, self-esteem, sense of self-worth, and sense of existence (spatial, temporal, and social). But one can easily imagine a brain in vitro as having the same identity as when it resided in a body. One cannot imagine a body without a brain (or with a different brain) as having the same identity it had before the brain was removed or replaced.
What if the brain in vitro (in the above example) could not communicate with us at all? Would we still think it is possessed of a self? The biological functions of people in coma are maintained. But do they have an identity, a self? If yes, why do we “pull the plug” on them so often?
It would seem (as it did to Locke) that we accept that someone has a self-identity if: (a) He has the same hardware as we do (notably, a brain) and (b) He communicates his humanly recognizable and comprehensible inner world to us and manipulates his environment. We accept that he has a given (i.e., the same continuous) self-identity if (c) He shows consistent intentional (i.e., willed) patterns (”memory”) in doing (b) for a long period of time.
It seems that we accept that we have a self-identity (i.e., we are self-conscious) if (a) We discern (usually through introspection) long term consistent intentional (i.e., willed) patterns (”memory”) in our manipulation (”relating to”) of our environment and (b) Others accept that we have a self-identity (Herbert Mead, Feuerbach).
Dan (probably) has the same hardware as we do (a brain). He communicates his (humanly recognizable and comprehensible) inner world to us (which is how he manipulates us and his environment). Thus, Dan clearly has a self-identity. But he is inconsistent. His intentional (willed) patterns, his memory, are incompatible with those demonstrated by Dan before the accident. Though he clearly is possessed of a self-identity, we cannot say that he has the SAME self-identity he possessed before the crash. In other words, we cannot say that he, indeed, is Dan.
Dan himself does not feel that he has a self-identity at all. He discerns intentional (willed) patterns in his manipulation of his environment but, due to his amnesia, he cannot tell if these are consistent, or long term. In other words, Dan has no memory. Moreover, others do not accept him as Dan (or have their doubts) because they have no memory of Dan as he is now.
Interim conclusion:
Having a memory is a necessary and sufficient condition for possessing a self-identity.
III. Repression
Yet, resorting to memory to define identity may appear to be a circular (even tautological) argument. When we postulate memory - don’t we already presuppose the existence of a “remembering agent” with an established self-identity?
Moreover, we keep talking about “discerning”, “intentional”, or “willed” patterns. But isn’t a big part of our self (in the form of the unconscious, full of repressed memories) unavailable to us? Don’t we develop defence mechanisms against repressed memories and fantasies, against unconscious content incongruent with our self-image? Even worse, this hidden, inaccessible, dynamically active part of our self is thought responsible for our recurrent discernible patterns of behaviour. The phenomenon of posthypnotic suggestion seems to indicate that this may be the case. The existence of a self-identity is, therefore, determined through introspection (by oneself) and observation (by others) of merely the conscious part of the self.
But the unconscious is as much a part of one’s self-identity as one’s conscious. What if, due to a mishap, the roles were reversed? What if Dan’s conscious part were to become his unconscious and his unconscious part - his conscious? What if all his conscious memories, drives, fears, wishes, fantasies, and hopes - were to become unconscious while his repressed memories, drives, etc. - were to become conscious? Would we still say that it is “the same” Dan and that he retains his self-identity? Not very likely. And yet, one’s (unremembered) unconscious - for instance, the conflict between id and ego - determines one’s personality and self-identity.
The main contribution of psychoanalysis and later psychodynamic schools is the understanding that self-identity is a dynamic, evolving, ever-changing construct - and not a static, inertial, and passive entity. It casts doubt over the meaningfulness of the question with which we ended the exposition: “Who, exactly, then, is Dan?” Dan is different at different stages of his life (Erikson) and he constantly evolves in accordance with his innate nature (Jung), past history (Adler), drives (Freud), cultural milieu (Horney), upbringing (Klein, Winnicott), needs (Murray), or the interplay with his genetic makeup. Dan is not a thing - he is a process. Even Dan’s personality traits and cognitive style, which may well be stable, are often influenced by Dan’s social setting and by his social interactions.
It would seem that having a memory is a necessary but insufficient condition for possessing a self-identity. One cannot remember one’s unconscious states (though one can remember their outcomes). One often forgets events, names, and other information even if it was conscious at a given time in one’s past. Yet, one’s (unremembered) unconscious is an integral and important part of one’s identity and one’s self. The remembered as well as the unremembered constitute one’s self-identity.
IV. The Memory Link
Hume said that to be considered in possession of a mind, a creature needs to have a few states of consciousness linked by memory in a kind of narrative or personal mythology. Can this conjecture be equally applied to unconscious mental states (e.g. subliminal perceptions, beliefs, drives, emotions, desires, etc.)?
In other words, can we rephrase Hume and say that to be considered in possession of a mind, a creature needs to have a few states of consciousness and a few states of the unconscious - all linked by memory into a personal narrative? Isn’t it a contradiction in terms to remember the unconscious?
The unconscious and the subliminal are instance of the general category of mental phenomena which are not states of consciousness (i.e., are not conscious). Sleep and hypnosis are two others. But so are “background mental phenomena” - e.g., one holds onto one’s beliefs and knowledge even when one is not aware (conscious) of them at every given moment. We know that an apple will fall towards the earth, we know how to drive a car (”automatically”), and we believe that the sun will rise tomorrow, even though we do not spend every second of our waking life consciously thinking about falling apples, driving cars, or the position of the sun.
Yet, the fact that knowledge and beliefs and other background mental phenomena are not constantly conscious - does not mean that they cannot be remembered. They can be remembered either by an act of will, or in (sometimes an involuntary) response to changes in the environment. The same applies to all other unconscious content. Unconscious content can be recalled. Psychoanalysis, for instance, is about re-introducing repressed unconscious content to the patient’s conscious memory and thus making it “remembered”.
In fact, one’s self-identity may be such a background mental phenomenon (always there, not always conscious, not always remembered). The acts of will which bring it to the surface are what we call “memory” and “introspection”.
This would seem to imply that having a self-identity is independent of having a memory (or the ability to introspect). Memory is just the mechanism by which one becomes aware of one’s background, “always-on”, and omnipresent (all-pervasive) self-identity. Self-identity is the object and predicate of memory and introspection. It is as though self-identity were an emergent extensive parameter of the complex human system - measurable by the dual techniques of memory and introspection.
We, therefore, have to modify our previous conclusions:
Having a memory is not a necessary nor a sufficient condition for possessing a self-identity.
We are back to square one. The poor souls in Oliver Sacks’ tome, “The Man Who Mistook his Wife for a Hat” are unable to create and retain memories. They occupy an eternal present, with no past. They are thus unable to access (or invoke) their self-identity by remembering it. Their self-identity is unavailable to them (though it is available to those who observe them over many years) - but it exists for sure. Therapy often succeeds in restoring pre-amnesiac memories and self-identity.
V. The Incorrigible Self
Self-identity is not only always-on and all-pervasive - but also incorrigible. In other words, no one - neither an observer, nor the person himself - can “disprove” the existence of his self-identity. No one can prove that a report about the existence of his (or another’s) self-identity is mistaken.
Is it equally safe to say that no one - neither an observer, nor the person himself - can prove (or disprove) the non-existence of his self-identity? Would it be correct to say that no one can prove that a report about the non-existence of his (or another’s) self-identity is true or false?
Dan’s criminal responsibility crucially depends on the answers to these questions. Dan cannot be held responsible for Jack’s murder if he can prove that he is ignorant of the facts of his action (i.e., if he can prove the non-existence of his self-identity). If he has no access to his (former) self-identity - he can hardly be expected to be aware and cognizant of these facts.
What is in question is not Dan’s mens rea, nor the application of the McNaghten tests (did Dan know the nature and quality of his act or could he tell right from wrong) to determine whether Dan was insane when he committed the crime. A much broader issue is at stake: is it the same person? Is the murderous Dan the same person as the current Dan? Even though Dan seems to own the same body and brain and is manifestly sane - he patently has no access to his (former) self-identity. He has changed so drastically that it is arguable whether he is still the same person - he has been “replaced”.
Finally, we can try to unite all the strands of our discourse into this double definition:
It would seem that we accept that someone has a self-identity if: (a) He has the same hardware as we do (notably, a brain) and, by implication, the same software as we do (an all-pervasive, omnipresent self-identity) and (b) He communicates his humanly recognizable and comprehensible inner world to us and manipulates his environment. We accept that he has a specific (i.e., the same continuous) self-identity if (c) He shows consistent intentional (i.e., willed) patterns (”memory”) in doing (b) for a long period of time.
It seems that we accept that we have a specific self-identity (i.e., we are self-conscious of a specific identity) if (a) We discern (usually through memory and introspection) long term consistent intentional (i.e., willed) patterns (”memory”) in our manipulation (”relating to”) of our environment and (b) Others accept that we have a specific self-identity.
In conclusion: Dan undoubtedly has a self-identity (being human and, thus, endowed with a brain). Equally undoubtedly, this self-identity is not Dan’s (but a new, unfamiliar, one).
Such is the stuff of our nightmares - body snatching, demonic possession, waking up in a strange place, not knowing who we are. Without a continuous personal history - we are not. It is what binds our various bodies, states of mind, memories, skills, emotions, and cognitions - into a coherent bundle of identity. Dan speaks, drinks, dances, talks, and makes love - but throughout that time, he is not present because he does not remember Dan and how it is to be Dan. He may have murdered Jake - but, by all philosophical and ethical criteria, it was most definitely not his fault.
The movie “I, Robot” is a muddled affair. It relies on shoddy pseudo-science and a general sense of unease that artificial (non-carbon based) intelligent life forms seem to provoke in us. But it goes no deeper than a comic book treatment of the important themes that it broaches. I, Robot is just another - and relatively inferior - entry is a long line of far better movies, such as “Blade Runner” and “Artificial Intelligence”.
Sigmund Freud said that we have an uncanny reaction to the inanimate. This is probably because we know that &ndash pretensions and layers of philosophizing aside &ndash we are nothing but recursive, self aware, introspective, conscious machines. Special machines, no doubt, but machines all the same.
Consider the James bond movies. They constitute a decades-spanning gallery of human paranoia. Villains change: communists, neo-Nazis, media moguls. But one kind of villain is a fixture in this psychodrama, in this parade of human phobias: the machine. James Bond always finds himself confronted with hideous, vicious, malicious machines and automata.
It was precisely to counter this wave of unease, even terror, irrational but all-pervasive, that Isaac Asimov, the late Sci-fi writer (and scientist) invented the Three Laws of Robotics:
A robot may not injure a human being or, through inaction, allow a human being to come to harm.
A robot must obey the orders given it by human beings, except where such orders would conflict with the First Law.
A robot must protect its own existence as long as such protection does not conflict with the First or Second Laws.
Many have noticed the lack of consistency and, therefore, the inapplicability of these laws when considered together.
First, they are not derived from any coherent worldview or background. To be properly implemented and to avoid their interpretation in a potentially dangerous manner, the robots in which they are embedded must be equipped with reasonably comprehensive models of the physical universe and of human society.
Without such contexts, these laws soon lead to intractable paradoxes (experienced as a nervous breakdown by one of Asimov’s robots). Conflicts are ruinous in automata based on recursive functions (Turing machines), as all robots are. Godel pointed at one such self destructive paradox in the “Principia Mathematica”, ostensibly a comprehensive and self consistent logical system. It was enough to discredit the whole magnificent edifice constructed by Russel and Whitehead over a decade.
Some argue against this and say that robots need not be automata in the classical, Church-Turing, sense. That they could act according to heuristic, probabilistic rules of decision making. There are many other types of functions (non-recursive) that can be incorporated in a robot, they remind us.
True, but then, how can one guarantee that the robot’s behavior is fully predictable ? How can one be certain that robots will fully and always implement the three laws? Only recursive systems are predictable in principle, though, at times, their complexity makes it impossible.
This article deals with some commonsense, basic problems raised by the Laws. The next article in this series analyses the Laws from a few vantage points: philosophy, artificial intelligence and some systems theories.
An immediate question springs to mind: HOW will a robot identify a human being? Surely, in a future of perfect androids, constructed of organic materials, no superficial, outer scanning will suffice. Structure and composition will not be sufficient differentiating factors.
There are two ways to settle this very practical issue: one is to endow the robot with the ability to conduct a Converse Turing Test (to separate humans from other life forms) - the other is to somehow “barcode” all the robots by implanting some remotely readable signaling device inside them (such as a RFID - Radio Frequency ID chip). Both present additional difficulties.
The second solution will prevent the robot from positively identifying humans. He will be able identify with any certainty robots and only robots (or humans with such implants). This is ignoring, for discussion’s sake, defects in manufacturing or loss of the implanted identification tags. And what if a robot were to get rid of its tag? Will this also be classified as a “defect in manufacturing”?
In any case, robots will be forced to make a binary choice. They will be compelled to classify one type of physical entities as robots &ndash and all the others as “non-robots”. Will non-robots include monkeys and parrots? Yes, unless the manufacturers equip the robots with digital or optical or molecular representations of the human figure (masculine and feminine) in varying positions (standing, sitting, lying down). Or unless all humans are somehow tagged from birth.
These are cumbersome and repulsive solutions and not very effective ones. No dictionary of human forms and positions is likely to be complete. There will always be the odd physical posture which the robot would find impossible to match to its library. A human disk thrower or swimmer may easily be classified as “non-human” by a robot - and so might amputated invalids.
What about administering a converse Turing Test?
This is even more seriously flawed. It is possible to design a test, which robots will apply to distinguish artificial life forms from humans. But it will have to be non-intrusive and not involve overt and prolonged communication. The alternative is a protracted teletype session, with the human concealed behind a curtain, after which the robot will issue its verdict: the respondent is a human or a robot. This is unthinkable.
Moreover, the application of such a test will “humanize” the robot in many important respects. Human identify other humans because they are human, too. This is called empathy. A robot will have to be somewhat human to recognize another human being, it takes one to know one, the saying (rightly) goes.
Let us assume that by some miraculous way the problem is overcome and robots unfailingly identify humans. The next question pertains to the notion of “injury” (still in the First Law). Is it limited only to physical injury (the elimination of the physical continuity of human tissues or of the normal functioning of the human body)?
Should “injury” in the First Law encompass the no less serious mental, verbal and social injuries (after all, they are all known to have physical side effects which are, at times, no less severe than direct physical “injuries”)? Is an insult an “injury”? What about being grossly impolite, or psychologically abusive? Or offending religious sensitivities, being politically incorrect - are these injuries? The bulk of human (and, therefore, inhuman) actions actually offend one human being or another, have the potential to do so, or seem to be doing so.
Consider surgery, driving a car, or investing money in the stock exchange. These “innocuous” acts may end in a coma, an accident, or ruinous financial losses, respectively. Should a robot refuse to obey human instructions which may result in injury to the instruction-givers?
Consider a mountain climber &ndash should a robot refuse to hand him his equipment lest he falls off a cliff in an unsuccessful bid to reach the peak? Should a robot refuse to obey human commands pertaining to the crossing of busy roads or to driving (dangerous) sports cars?
Which level of risk should trigger robotic refusal and even prophylactic intervention? At which stage of the interactive man-machine collaboration should it be activated? Should a robot refuse to fetch a ladder or a rope to someone who intends to commit suicide by hanging himself (that’s an easy one)?
Should he ignore an instruction to push his master off a cliff (definitely), help him climb the cliff (less assuredly so), drive him to the cliff (maybe so), help him get into his car in order to drive him to the cliff… Where do the responsibility and obeisance bucks stop?
Whatever the answer, one thing is clear: such a robot must be equipped with more than a rudimentary sense of judgment, with the ability to appraise and analyse complex situations, to predict the future and to base his decisions on very fuzzy algorithms (no programmer can foresee all possible circumstances). To me, such a “robot” sounds much more dangerous (and humanoid) than any recursive automaton which does NOT include the famous Three Laws.
Moreover, what, exactly, constitutes “inaction”? How can we set apart inaction from failed action or, worse, from an action which failed by design, intentionally? If a human is in danger and the robot tries to save him and fails &ndash how could we determine to what extent it exerted itself and did everything it could?
How much of the responsibility for a robot’s inaction or partial action or failed action should be imputed to the manufacturer &ndash and how much to the robot itself? When a robot decides finally to ignore its own programming &ndash how are we to gain information regarding this momentous event? Outside appearances can hardly be expected to help us distinguish a rebellious robot from a lackadaisical one.
The situation gets much more complicated when we consider states of conflict.
Imagine that a robot is obliged to harm one human in order to prevent him from hurting another. The Laws are absolutely inadequate in this case. The robot should either establish an empirical hierarchy of injuries &ndash or an empirical hierarchy of humans. Should we, as humans, rely on robots or on their manufacturers (however wise, moral and compassionate) to make this selection for us? Should we abide by their judgment which injury is the more serious and warrants an intervention?
A summary of the Asimov Laws would give us the following “truth table”:
A robot must obey human commands except if:
Obeying them is likely to cause injury to a human, or
Obeying them will let a human be injured.
A robot must protect its own existence with three exceptions:
That such self-protection is injurious to a human;
That such self-protection entails inaction in the face of potential injury to a human;
That such self-protection results in robot insubordination (failing to obey human instructions).
Trying to create a truth table based on these conditions is the best way to demonstrate the problematic nature of Asimov’s idealized yet highly impractical world.
Here is an exercise:
Imagine a situation (consider the example below or one you make up) and then create a truth table based on the above five conditions. In such a truth table, “T” would stand for “compliance” and “F” for non-compliance.
Example:
A radioactivity monitoring robot malfunctions. If it self-destructs, its human operator might be injured. If it does not, its malfunction will equally seriously injure a patient dependent on his performance.
One of the possible solutions is, of course, to introduce gradations, a probability calculus, or a utility calculus. As they are phrased by Asimov, the rules and conditions are of a threshold, yes or no, take it or leave it nature. But if robots were to be instructed to maximize overall utility, many borderline cases would be resolved.
Still, even the introduction of heuristics, probability, and utility does not help us resolve the dilemma in the example above. Life is about inventing new rules on the fly, as we go, and as we encounter new challenges in a kaleidoscopically metamorphosing world. Robots with rigid instruction sets are ill suited to cope with that.
Note - Godel’s Theorems
The work of an important, though eccentric, Czech-Austrian mathematical logician, Kurt G
DIVs vs. Tables: What will you choose for your webpage?
Tables have always prompted eye-gouging hissy fits amongst different web designers and accessibility advocates of every stripe. Both the side saddle with myth and have debated in larger part from the conventional ideology.
Why Table layouts were preferred?
Most of us know that prior to the arrival of style sheets, layout tables worked fine with everyone. Experts felt that Data tables were hard and most users preferred layout tables, as they were simple. Most people preferred tables for two reasons over DIVs. Firstly, they were around for a longer period with the web designers. Secondly, they offer a faster method for creating page layouts that are grid-based.
Simple layouts have been amongst the few reasons that have made some users have gripes against DIVs. Again, DIVs have sketchy supports for numerous browsers too. Experts used to feel that it will always be a difficult task of replacing tabular layouts with DIVs. Tabular layouts have mostly similar layouts in numerous ancient browsers (graphical).
Advantages of DIVs
However recently, some of the web designers have felt that DIVs have numerous advantages over tabular layouts. They have found out that DIVs are:
- Having page size much smaller than tables and are quicker in loading on most browsers
- The flexibility of future with further development is there with DIVs
- The source file is much easier for reading
- DIVs are friendlier in terms of different search engines
Reason for which you should shift from layout tables
Layout tables were formulated for providing structures to a data, meaning all the data had a particular variable and they were systematically stored. This was the intended use of the tables. Wide deployed subsets are included in HTML 3.2. Its standard says that tables could be utilized for tabular markup or for layouts.
However, languages in draft indicate that semantic or structural uses are preferred. This matter has even been settled with the continuously growing DIVs support. Experts feel that separating the structural data reduces the cost of maintaining them for the webmasters. Mixing the information leads to increase in ownership cost and less portability in between media and applications. With the use of tables, semantic meaning of the web page is lost. Text-only or speech browsers do not enjoy such layouts. DIVs switching allows the formation of a simple and accessible decipher web page.
How can DIVs give better performance?
Some web designers feel that DIVs can never be a replacement for such table-based layouts. Still, they feel that if browsers can work their act properly, the former can create simple layouts with little hassle. It provides you with an easy and simple environment for changing layouts. There is no requirement for modifying each page in DIVs, which is the case with tables. Again supplementing the data with extra sections are also considered simpler than their counterpart.
The final decision is in your hand
It is sometimes difficult to decide on table layouts and DIVs as both of them have striking advantages and disadvantages. Table poses hard work and extra cost to web owners, whereas DIVs might not be compatible with different browsers. In the end, the decision is in your hand to decide what will it be for your web page: An ancient table or a modern DIV or CSS.
By following these ten steps, you will become a more efficient note taker and this will help improve your overall study skills. With good note taking skills, better grades are just around the corner.
1. If possible, sit near the front and center of the class. You will be less likely to become distracted and will probably find staying focused easier.
2. Use a binder instead of a traditional notebook. This way you can add, rearrange, or rewrite pages of your notes, insert handouts and assessments in the appropriate chronological order and review the material covered in the chapter/unit much easier.
3. Put headings and the date on all papers. Organize them chronologically in your binder.
4. Take notes on loose-leaf paper and keep them organized in a three-ring binder. Make sure that you hole punch and add all of the handouts, assignments, quizzes, tests, etc. to your binder. It usually is best if everything for the entire chapter/unit is kept in chronological order in your binder.
5. Think about what is being said before you write anything down. Do not write down everything the teacher says. Pick out important phrases, terms, and concepts to focus on.
6. Record any examples the teacher may give while lecturing. Examples are extremely important in creating connections in your brain and in helping to jog your memory while studying.
7. Look for cues that teachers give to indicate that something is important. For instance, they may repeat something a few times, change the volume or tone of their voice, write it on the board or overhead, and/or creates lists for you. Be sure to ask them to repeat what they have just said if you miss the initial cue but later realize that you should be writing the material down.
8. Leave some space between portions of your notes so you can make additional comments as you study or read the text.
9. Re-write or even re-TYPE your notes. Not only will your notes be much more organized and make studying easier, but the practice of re-writing notes gives you another opportunity to think about the material as you write or type it again. Make sure that you re-write them in a timely manner. The more time that passes between taking the original notes and re-writing them, the less effective this strategy is.
10. Review these notes often. The more times you see them, the easier it is to commit them to memory and the less time you will spend studying them prior to the test.
Go to .live-etutor.com to learn more about online tutoring and watch a virtual tour inside of our online classroom. All tutors are screened, qualified and ready to help your child get better grades!
This is a chapter of
“Healing Psyche - Patterns and Structure of Complementary Psychological Cancer Treatment (CPCT)”
In their search for health, clients are willing to try anything, hoping for a miracle cure. They often reason that they might as well try it because “they have nothing to lose.” Unfortunately, there is something to lose. Clients might gain a false sense of hope. They might lose interest in mainstream medicine or other complementary approaches. Finally, they might also be robbed of valuable time by pursuing an unsatisfactory therapy.
Complementary psychological therapy is often questioned on issues such as false hope. Some people are afraid that if cancer clients experience hope, they are fooling themselves, and will end up being disappointed. They think that as long as they are expecting the worst, they will not be disappointed. This is a form of false hopelessness. Such people like to call themselves realists, but are in fact pessimists.
Many people misinterpret the true value of an optimistic, pessimistic or realistic view of life. Pessimistic people view the world as a dark place, where there is only misery and everything is hopeless. They deny the positive side of things. Optimistic people view the world as one happy playground, where there is joy everywhere. They deny the negative side of life. Realistic people know that there are positive and negative aspects of everything in life. They fully accept both sides.
“No one really knows enough to be a pessimist.”
- Norman Cousins -
- Pessimist: My glass is almost empty.
- Optimist: My glass is still full.
- Realist: I have half a glass.
When therapists work with the psychological issues that are described in this work, they are not providing false hope, but are assisting clients in being more realistic. Realistic hope is what is being communicated in this therapeutic approach.
Society and the medical team often issue some sort of death guarantee (although lesser every day) along with the diagnosis of cancer. Fortunately, this is not the case. There is no guarantee that one will die from cancer. On the other hand, there is also no guarantee that one will heal from cancer after the intervention. The issue of false hope only exists when the practitioner (medical or psychological) issues a guarantee that the client is healed after the intervention. False hope is thus only present as a false guarantee.
The presence of hope within clients is often associated with better health, and hopelessness is often a precursor for poor outcomes. Presenting hope, however, is no guarantee, but it assists the healing process.
Example:
When people marry, there is no guarantee that they will be joyful. They hope they will be. This could be interpreted by a pessimist as false hope.
However, expecting the marriage to end in a few years is almost a guarantee that it will.
Hoping that one will be happy is no guarantee, but it surely helps.
Feelings of hope stimulate the placebo effect. The possible effects of a placebo cannot be denied, even in the context of cancer.
“Everybody knows that one dies of cancer, but I was not sure whether to apply this to myself. I considered this (belief) as nonsense.”
Quote from a spontaneous remission patient
- Daan van Baalen - (1987[1])
False hope is real, and can be seen as focusing solely on unachievable results, while denying the current truth. Such unrealistic expectations lead to disappointment and feelings of guilt. Hope of healing is a realistic hope. Realistic or mature hope is accepting the current feelings, thoughts, relationships, and possibilities of improvement. Focusing solely on hopelessness and self-pity is just as unrealistic as only seeing a positive and bright future.
False hope
- I only focus on the positive.
- I can do whatever I want.
- I can control everything.
False hopelessness
- I am wallowing in despair.
- I cannot control anything.
- Everything scares me and the disease and emotions are controlling me.
Realistic hope
- Sometimes I feel awful, and other times I feel more connected to life and others than ever before.
- There are some things beyond my control. Yet, there are many things I can control.
- I choose to live as fully as possible now. The quality of my life may be related to my physical health, but however long I may live, I plan to do it to the fullest of my ability.
Hope initiates actions, and stimulates well-being. Without hope, people do not take action towards their health. Hope is a supporting emotion as well as a drive to trigger positive actions towards increased self-control.
Solano et al. (1993[2]) studied the connection between psychosocial situations and the probability of symptom development. They concluded that “The
best attitude with regard to prognosis appears to be full recognition of
one’s situation and a decisive will to do something about it.” This conclusion is supported by many other authors. Hopelessness triggers inaction and letting things happen. Hope triggers the decisive will to take action.
“Trust in god and tie your camel to a tree.”
- Muhammad -
[1] Baalen, van, Daan C. & Vries, de, Marco J. (1987) Spontaneous regression of cancer - A clinical, pathological and psycho-social study, Rotterdam: Erasmus University
[2] Solano, L. & Costa, M. & Salvati, S. & Coda, R. & Aiuti, F. & Mezzaroma, I. & Bertini, M. (1993) ‘Psychosocial factors and clinical evolution in HIV-1 infection - a longitudinal study, J. of Psychosomatic Research,A 37(1):39-51
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Healing Psyche - Helping the mind heal
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Education is failing in the United States. By saying this, I know that I join the ranks of the self-appointed Cassandra’s who hurl our hands up to our foreheads and sing the doom of a nation. But it’s true.
And most of the wailers miss the point. Underlying the political agendas, funding battles, culture wars, and the simultaneous disrespect for and outrageous expectations of teachers, there is a much deeper failure.
Think of a moment in your life when you were completely caught up in learning something. In that moment, learning wasn’t about facts, tests or grades, succeeding or failing. Instead, it was an all-consuming, joyful burst of energy and pleasure at finally discovering something. Of understanding something. To borrow from Shakespeare, it was an instance of god-like apprehension, comprehension of our place as partners in a creative universe.
How often have you had a moment like that in your educational process? If you’re like most people, pretty rarely. Somewhere along the line, education became a consumerist contest of amassing skills and factoids and spewing them back to the world like game show geeks. But when we become glorified databases, we lose the analytical abilities that keep us from being engulfed by systems (be they political, religious, societal, or media) without bothering to ask if they should exist at all. We have all of the pieces out of the puzzle box and arrayed on the table, but we don’t have a picture to follow.
And that’s what we’re missing: the picture. The image. The imagining. Our failure is a failure of imagination, both in what we teach and how we teach it, but also, far more importantly, a failure to understand that education is ultimately about imagination itself.
When we become imaginal learners, we move beyond passive collectors of information into creators. We find the enchantment, the poetics of learning, and we can imagine entire universes into being. Learning becomes a spiraling generative process that invites us to continue to learn and to shape ourselves and our worlds.
So what would an imaginal education look like? Part of its beauty, and admittedly, its complexity, is that there isn’t one answer. It is an invitation for each learner to understand herself and the world around her as a classroom. It is about inviting wonder to be your partner, and continually asking “why” and “how” and “what if” about everything and everyone that crosses your path.
Since it is so vast, let me try to sketch out an example from a very small, prosaic beginning point: the number 32. I have a painful memory of standing in a classroom with flashing cards and spots before my eyes, trying to spit out multiplication tables. But in spite of that (mostly because I count on my fingers), I know that eight times four is thirty-two.
In an imaginal learning context, the flash cards are gone. The walls of the classroom are gone, replaced by a hillside on a quiet night where the stars seem made for counting, and infinity has a tangible and richly mythic presence. So I lie on my back, and imagine a life for the number 32. A combination of eight (a sideways symbol of infinity) and four (of the four elements) make up the sinuous and stable combination of thirty-two. I imagine its colors, its own suggestion of infinity when turned sideways &ndash like three mountains and the beginnings of a fourth.
And then I begin to count. Eight constellations, each of four stars. Sixteen pairings of two. I remember the stories of the constellations. I make up poems with four stanzas of eight lines each, and drum out rhythms in 4/4 and 2/4 time. And then I explore 32 as a leaping point into other thoughts, other disciplines, awareness of myself and those around me. For example, in the Buddhist tradition, there are 32 body parts. How many can I count? And what lies underneath a philosophy that identifies the body this way? Or, I look to language. Balagt